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Abstract 
In recent years, various fotmalizations of nonmonotonic reasoning and different semantics 
for normal and disjunctive logic programs have been proposed, including autoepistemic logic, 
circumscription, CWA, GCWA, ECWA, epistemic specifications, table, well-founded, stationary 
and static semantics of normal and disjunctive logic programs. 
In this paper we introduce a simple nonmonotonic knowledge representation framework which 
isomorphically contains all of the above-mentioned nonmonotonic formalisms and semantics as 
special cases and yet is significantly more expressive than each one of these formalisms considered 
individually. The new formalism, called the Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB, 
is obtained by augmenting Moore’s autoepistemic logic, AEL, already employing the knowledge 
operator, C, with an additional belief operator, t?. As a result, we are able to reason not only 
about formulae F which are known to be true (i.e., those for which CF holds) but also about 
those which are only believed to be true (i.e., those for which !3F holds). 
The proposed logic constitutes a powerful new formalism which can serve as a unifyingfrume- 
work for several major nonmonotonic formalisms. It allows us to better understand mutual re- 
lationships existing between different formalisms and semantics and enables us to provide them 
with simpler and more natural definitions. It also naturally leads to new, even more expressive, 
flexible and modular formalizations and semantics. @ 1997 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
Moore’s autoepistemic logic, AEL [ 201, is obtained by augmenting classical proposi- 
tional logic with a modal operator L. The intended meaning of the modal atom LF in 
a stable autoepistemic expansion is “F is provable” or “F is logically derivable”. Thus 
Moore’s modal operator L can be viewed as a “knowledge operator” which allows us 
to reason about formulae known to be true in some stable expansion.2 However, often 
times in addition to reasoning about statements which are known to be true we also 
need to reason about those statements that are only believed to be true, where what is 
believed or not believed is determined by some specific nonmonotonicformalism. 
For example, consider a scenario in which: 
l You rent a movie if you believe that you will neither go to a baseball game nor to 
a football game. 
l You do not buy tickets to a game if you don’t know that you will go to watch it. 
We could describe this scenario as follows: 3 
&baseball A &football > rentmovie 
TLbaseball A TLfootball> dontbuy-tickets. 
Assuming that initially this is all you know and that your beliefs are based on minimal 
entailment (circumscription), you will likely rent a movie because you believe that you 
will not go to watch any games (i.e., both lbaseball and Ifootball hold in all minimal 
models) and you will not buy tickets because you don’t know that you will go to any 
of the games (i.e., neither baseball nor football is provable). 
Suppose now that you learn that you will either go to a baseball game or to a football 
game: 
baseball V football. 
In the new scenario you will no longer rent a movie (because Tbaseball A Ifootball 
no longer holds in all minimal models) but you will not buy any tickets either because 
you don’t know yet which game you are going to watch (i.e., neither baseball nor 
football is provable). 
Finally, suppose that you eventually learn that you in fact go to a baseball game: 
baseball. 
Clearly, you no longer believe in not buying tickets because you now know that you 
are going to watch a specific game (i.e., baseball is provable). 
Observe, that in the above example the roles played by the knowledge and belief 
operators are quite different and one cannot be substituted by the other. In particular, 
we cannot replace the premise Bybaseball A B-football in the first implication by 
LTbaseball A Llfootball because that would result in rent-movie not being true in first 
* Moore’s modal operator .L is usually referred to as a “belief operator”. In Section 2.1 we explain why we 
prefer to view it as a “knowledge operator”. 
3 The second clause could be equivalently written as: buy-rickets 3 Lbaseball V Lfootball. 
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scenario.4 Similarly, we cannot replace it by Xbaseball A 4football because that 
would result in rent-movie being true in the second scenario. 5 
In order to be able to explicitly reason about beliefs, we introduce a new nonmonotonic 
formalism, called the Autoepisternic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB, obtained 
by augmenting Moore’s autoepistemic logic, AEL, already employing the knowledge 
operator, C, with the additional belief operator, 23. As a result, we will be able to 
reason not only about formulae F which are known to be true (i.e., those for which CF 
holds) but also about those which are only believed to be true (i.e., those for which t3F 
holds). 
The resulting nonmonotonic knowledge representation framework turns out to be 
rather simple and yet quite powerful. We prove that several of the major nonmonotonic 
formalisms and semantics for normal and disjunctive logic programs are isomorphically 
embedduble into AELB. In particular this applies to autoepistemic logic [ 201; propo- 
sitional circumscription [ 15,181; CWA [ 3 1 ] ; GCWA [ 191; ECWA [ 131; epistemic 
specifications [ lo]; stable, well-founded, stationary and static semantics of normal and 
disjunctive logic programs [ 11,12,26,29,34]. At the same time the Autoepistemic 
Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB, is significantly more expressive and flexible 
than each one of these formalisms considered individually. 
The proposed logic constitutes a powerful new formalism which can serve as a 
unifying framework for several major nonmonotonic formalisms. It allows us to better 
understand mutual relationships existing between different formalisms and semantics and 
enables us to provide them with simpler and more natural definitions. It also naturally 
leads to new, even more expressive and modular formalizations and semantics. 
The paper is organized as follows: 
In-Section 2 we introduce the Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB, 
and establish its basic properties. We also show that both Moore’s Autoepistemic 
Logic, AEL, and McCarthy’s Circumscription are embeddable into AELB. 
Section 3 is devoted to a detailed study of the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs, 
AEB, a sub-logic of AELB whose theories are limited to formulae which do not 
use the knowledge operator C. It turns out that the logic AEB has some very nice 
and regular properties. In particular, any such theory has the least static expansion 
which can be iteratively constructed as the fixed point of a natural minimal model 
operator. 
In Section 4 we demonstrate that normal and disjunctive logic programs, under all 
major semantics, can be equivalently translated into theories in the logic AELB. 
This allows us to better understand the meaning of different semantics and their 
mutual relations. 
In Section 5 we show that also Gelfond’s epistemic specifications can be easily 
represented as special knowledge and belief theories in the logic AELB. As a 
byproduct we establish a simple duality relationship between the two operators 
appearing in Gelfond’s logic. 
4 Because neither -baseball nor +mrball is provable 
’ Because neither baseball norfiwfball is provable. 
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l In Section 6 we illustrate how the meaning of theories in AELB can be adjusted by 
suitably changing the underlying nonmonotonic formalism on which the notion of 
belief is based. In previous sections we demonstrated that the semantics of AELB 
can be also changed by adding suitable axioms to the logic. 
l Section 7 contains concluding remarks and a brief discussion of other applications 
of the logic AELB and of its relationship to other proposed logics. 
2. Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs 
The language of the Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB, is a propo- 
sitional modal language, ICLJ, with standard connectives (V, A, 3, T), the propositional 
letter l_ (denotingfalse) and two modal operators L and a, called knowledge and belief 
operators, respectively. The atomic formulae of the form LF (respectively, 23F), where 
F is an arbitrary formula of Ic,c,n, are called knowledge atoms (respectively, belief 
atoms). The intended meaning of LF is “F is known” while the intended meaning of 
BF is “F is believed” (we make it precise later on in this section). Knowledge and 
belief atoms are jointly referred to as introspective atoms. Observe that arbitrary nestings 
of introspective atoms are allowed. 
The formulae of IC,Q in which neither L nor B occurs are called objective and the 
set of all such formulae is denoted by Ic. Similarly, the set of all formulae of ICC,J in 
which only C (respectively, only L?) occurs is denoted by icr. (respectively, Ice). Any 
theory T in the language ICL,B will be called an autoepistemic theory of knowledge and 
beliefs, or, briefly, a knowledge and belief theory. 
Definition 2.1. (Knowledge and belief theories) By an autoepistemic theory of knowl- 
edge and beliefs or just a knowledge and belief theory we mean an arbitrary theory in 
the language JCLJ, i.e., a (possibly infinite) set of arbitrary clauses of the form 
B1 A... A B,, A BG, A.. . A BGk A CH, A.. . A LH,y > 
Al V... V Al V i3F, V . V l3F,, V LK, V . . . V CK, 
where m, n, k, 1, s, t 3 0, the A,s and BiS are objective atoms and the FiS, GiS, His and 
KiS are arbitrary formulae of ICLJ. 
Equivalently, a knowledge and belief theory consists of a set of arbitrary clauses of 
the form 
B, A ’ . . A B,, A t3G, A. . . A t3Gk A CH, A.. A LH,y A 
43F, A . . . A -a& A TLK, A . . . A TLK, > A, V ... V Ai 
which say that if the BiS are true, the Gis are believed, the His are known, the FiS are 
not believed and the KiS are not known then one of the AiS is true. 
By an afJirmative knowledge and belief theory we mean any such theory all of whose 
clauses satisfy the condition that 1 > 0. 
By a rational knowledge and belief theory we mean any such theory all of whose 
clauses satisfy the condition that n = 0. 
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In other words, afirmative knowledge and belief theories are precisely those theories 
that satisfy the condition that all of their clauses contain at least one positive objective 
atom. On the other hand, rational knowledge and belief theories are precisely those 
theories none of whose clauses contain any positive belief atoms BF;:. 
We assume the following two simple axiom schemata and one inference rule describ- 
ing the arguably obvious properties of belief atoms: 
(D) Consistency Axiom: 
-a_L 
(K) Normality Axiom: For any formulae F and G of the language ICL.,B: 
B(F>G) > (l3FxBG) 
(N) Necessitation Inference R&e: For any formula F of the language XLJ: 
(1) 
(2) 
F 
BF’ 
(3) 
The Consistency Axiom (D) states that falsity I is not believed. The Normality 
Axiom (K) states that if we believe that F implies G and if we believe in F then 
we should believe in G as well. The Necessitation Rule (N) says that anything that is 
provable in the logic AELB is necessarily also believed. 
Remark 2.2. Strictly speaking, the necessitation inference rule (N) is not needed be- 
cause it is automatically satisfied in all “stable” theories (more precisely, in all static 
autoepistemic expansions that are defined in Section 2.2). Moreover, one can show that 
its omission results in the same “stable” theories. 
Analogous axioms (D) and (K) and rule (N) could be as well assumed about the 
knowledge operator C but they are also automatically satisfied in all “stable” theories 
and thus can be safely omitted. 
A modal logic is normal [ 221 if it includes the normality axiom (K) and is closed 
under the necessitation rule (N) . In view of the above comments, one could equivalently 
define the underlying logic of AELB as a normal modal logic with two modal operators 
satisfying the (“no dead ends”) Consistency Axiom (D). In the next subsection, we 
define static expansions of theories in this logic which provide a suitable meaning to 
the knowledge and belief atoms. 
Definition 2.3. (Formulae derivable from a knowledge and belief theory). For any 
knowledge and belief theory T, we denote by Cn, (T) the smallest set of formulae 
of the language &J which contains the theory T, all (substitution instances of) the 
axioms (D) and (K) and is closed under the Necessitation Rule (N) and under standard 
propositional consequence. 
We say that a formula F is derivable from a knowledge and belief theory T in the 
logic AELB if F belongs to Cn, (T). We denote this fact by T !--, F. Consequently, 
Cn,(T) = {F 1 T t, F}. 
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We call a knowledge and belief theory T consistent if the theory Cn, (T) is consistent. 
Clearly, T is consistent if and only if T y+ 1. 
The following proposition will be frequently used in the sequel. 
Proposition 2.4. The following sentences and derivation rules are valid in the logic 
AELB for any formulae F and G of the language K,Q: 
U(FAG) = l?FABG (4) 
t3F > -23lF (5) 
t3( F v G) > 7%F v l&G (6) 
F-G 
i3F = BG 
(7) 
The first sentence states that beliefs are distributive with respect to conjunction, i.e., 
that a conjunction of two formulae is believed if and only if each one of them is 
believed. The second sentence says that if a formula is believed then its negation is not 
believed. The last sentence says that if we believe in a disjunction of formulae F V G 
then we either disbelieve 1F or we disbelieve 1G. 
The inference rule states that if two formulae are known to be equivalent then so are 
their belief atoms In other words, the meaning of BF does not depend on the specific 
form of the formula F, e.g., the formula f3( F A 1F) is equivalent to a( I) and thus it 
is false by (D) . 
Proof. Proof of (4). We first show that 
t-*@FAG) >t3FAt3G 
Clearly, 1, (F A G) > F and therefore, by the Necessitation Rule (N), we have 
t--, a( (F A G) > F). From the Normality Axiom (K) we infer that t--, a( F A G) > 
23F. Similarly, t, 23( F II G) > f3G. It follows that k* a( F A G) > BF A f?G. 
We now show that 
I-* t?FAl3G>l3<FAG). 
Clearly, t, F > (G > F A G) and therefore, by the Necessitation Rule (N), we have 
E+ B( F > (G > F A G)). From the Normality Axiom (K) we infer that E* BF > 
B(G > F A G). Applying the Normality Axiom (K) again we conclude that k* i3F > 
(BG~B(FAG)).Thisshowsthatt,BFABG>~(FAG). 
Proof of (5). Clearly 1, (F A -F) > 1. By the Necessitation Rule (N) we get 
t-, B( (F A 1F) > I) and thus by the Normality Axiom (K), t-* O( F A -F) > BI. 
Consequently, the Consistency Axiom (D) implies E* -f3( F A 7F). Using (4) we 
obtain t--, -BF V -&F which is equivalent to i-, l3F > -&F. 
Proof of (6). By (5)) I* I?( F V G) > -l3( 1F A -G). From (4) we conclude that 
t, a( F V G) > -(l&F A B-G). This proves that k, L?( F V G) > l&F V -%G. 
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Proof of (7). If t--, F = G then, by necessitation, l--, t?(F z G) and thus, by normal- 
ity, F, l3F z BG. q 
2.1. Intended meaning of knowledge and belief atoms 
The modal operator L of Moore’s Autoepistemic Logic, AEL, is usually referred to as 
a “belief operator” [ 201. However, when restricted to stable autoepistemic expansions 
(which fully determine the semantics of AEL) it in fact plays the role of a “knowledge 
operator”. Indeed, in any stable autoepistemic expansion T we have: 
TkLF iff Tj=F, (8) 
for any formula F. In other words, LF holds in the expansion T if and only if “F is 
known” in T, or, more precisely, if F is logically derivable6 from T. 
As we argued in the Introduction, in addition to reasoning about statements which are 
known to be true in “stable” expansions of knowledge and belief theories, we also need 
to reason about those statements that are only believed to be true, where what is believed 
or not believed is determined by some specific nonmonotonic formalism. Consequently, 
we want the new modal “belief operator” t3 of AELB to satisfy the condition that a 
formula F is believed in a “stable” expansion T if F is nonmonotonically derivable 
from T: 
T kl3F if T k=,,,, E 
where k,,,, denotes a specific nonmonotonic inference relation. 
(9) 
In general, different nonmonotonic inference relations, knrn, can be used, including 
various forms of predicate and formula circumscription [ 15,181. In this paper we select a 
specific nonmonotonic inference relation, namely a form of Minker’s Generalized Closed 
World Assumption GCWA (see [ 13,191) or McCarthy’s predicate circumscription [ 181 
which says that a formula F is believed to be true if F is true in all minimal models 
of the theory, i.e., if F is minimally entailed. In other words, we require that the belief 
atoms DF satisfy the condition: 
T k BF if T b=,i, E (10) 
where ktin is the minimal entailment operator defined below. Accordingly, beliefs 
considered in this paper are based on the principle of predicate minimization and thus 
can be called minimal beliefs. 
We now give a precise definition of minimal models of knowledge and belief theories 
and the minimal entailment operator, kmin. In the next subsection we define static 
autoepistemic expansions of knowledge and belief theories which precisely enforce the 
meaning of the belief operator B discussed above. 
‘Observe, however, that since derivability in a static expansion is based not only on the formulae present in 
the original theory, i.e., on the initial knowledge, when we refer to the operator LCF as a “knowledge operator” 
we have in fact in mind a form of subjective knodedge. Needless to say, subjective knowledge can also be 
viewed as a form of belief. 
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Throughout the paper we represent models as (consistent) sets of literals. An atom A 
is true in a model M if and only if A belongs to M. An atom A is false in a model M 
if and only if -A belongs to M. A model M is total if for every atom A either A or 1A 
belongs to M. Otherwise, the model is called partial. Unless stated otherwise, all models 
are assumed to be total models. A (total) model M is smaller than a (total) model N 
if it contains fewer positive literals (atoms). For simplicity, when describing models we 
usually list only those of their members that are relevant to our considerations, typically 
those whose predicate symbols appear in the theory that we are currently discussing. 
Definition 2.5. (Minimal models) By a minimal model of a knowledge and belief theory 
T we mean a model M of T with the property that there is 110 smaller model N of T 
which coincides with M on introspective atoms l3F and CF. If a formula F is true in 
all minimal models of T then we write 
and say that F is minimally entailed by T. 
For readers familiar with circumscription, this means that we are considering predicate 
circumscription CIRC( T; Kc) of the theory T in which atoms from the objective language 
K are minimized while the introspective atoms BF and CF are fixed:7 
In other words, minimal models are obtained by assigning arbitrary truth values to the 
introspective atoms and then minimizing objective atoms. 
Remark 2.6. The main reason for using the minimal model entailment as a basis for 
beliefs is its simplicity and the fact that it plays a fundamental role in the semantics of 
logic programs and deductive databases (see [ 291). However, various other nonmono- 
tonic formalisms can be used to define the meaning of beliefs. In Section 6 we discuss 
some possible alternatives. 
The reason why we minimize only objective atoms is that the objective atoms A 
represent object-level knowledge which, according to the closed world assumption, has 
to be minimized in order to arrive at minimal beliefs BA. On the other hand, introspective 
atoms BF and CF intuitively describe me&z-level knowledge, namely, a plausible rational 
scenario, which is not subject to minimization. 
Example 2.7. Consider the following knowledge and belief theory T: 
Car 
Car A BTBroken > ShouldRun 
Let us prove that T minimally entails -Broken, i.e., T kmi, TBroken. Indeed, in order 
to find minimal models of T we need to assign an arbitrary truth value to the only belief 
7 The author is grateful to L. Yuan for pointing out the need to use circumscription that minimizes only 
objective rather than all propositional atoms 1351. 
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atom BTBroken, and then minimize the objective atoms Broken, Car and ShouldRun. We 
easily see that T has the following two minimal models (truth values of the remaining 
belief atoms are irrelevant and are therefore omitted): 
M 1 = {&Broken, Car, ShouldRun, TBroken}, 
M2 = {+%Broken, Car, +houldRun, -Broken}. 
Since in both of them Car is true, and Broken is false, we deduce that T ktin Car and 
T bti,, YBroken. 
2.2. Static autoepistemic expansions 
Like Moore’s autoepistemic logic, AEL, the autoepistemic logic of knowledge and 
beliefs, AELB, models the set of knowledge and beliefs that an ideally rational and 
introspective agent may hold given a set of premises T. It does so by defining the so- 
called static autoepistemic expansions T* of T, which constitute plausible sets of such 
rational beliefs. 
Definition 2.8. (Static autoepistemic expansion) A theory T’ is called a static au- 
toepistemic expansion of a knowledge and belief theory T if it satisfies the following 
fixed-point equation: 
where F ranges over all formulae of KL,B. 
Definition 2.9. (Static semantics) By the (skeptical 8 ) static semantics Stat(T) of a 
knowledge and belief theory T we mean the set of all formulae that belong to all static 
autoepistemic expansions T” of T. 
Every theory has one inconsistent static expansion (which will typically be of no 
interest to us) and zero, one or more consistent static expansions. As we will show in 
the next section, a broad class of theories always has a consistent least (in the sense of 
inclusion) static expansion which therefore coincides with the static semantics. 
It follows from the above definition that a static autoepistemic expansion T* of a 
knowledge and belief theory T is built by augmenting T with: 
l those knowledge atoms CF for which the formula F is logically implied by T*, 
l negations 4F of the remaining knowledge atoms 13F, 
l those belief atoms BF for which the formula F is minimally entailed by T” 
and closing it under derivation in the logic AELB. Observe that since T’ appears on 
both sides of the equation the above definition represents a fixed-point equation. The 
first part of the definition is identical to the definition of stable autoepistemic expansions 
’ More generally, any class S of static expansions of a knowledge and belief theory T (in particular, a one- 
element class) naturally defines the corresponding (credulous) static semanrics consisting of those formulae 
that belong to all expansions from the class S. 
124 TC. Przymusinski/Artificial Intelligence 95 (1997) 115-154 
in Moore’s autoepistemic logic, AEL. However, as we will show, the addition of belief 
atoms BF results in a much more powerful nonmonotonic logic which contains, as 
special cases, several well-known nonmonotonic formalisms. 
Note that negations 43F of the remaining belief atoms (i.e., those for which the 
formula F is it minimally entailed by T*) are not explicitly added to the expansion, 
although, as we will see below, some of them will be forced in by the Consistency and 
Normality Axioms (1) and (2). However, their status in the expansion can be easily 
determined by using the knowledge operator C, instead. Namely, from the formula ( 11) 
(see below) it follows immediately that for any static autoepistemic expansion T* the 
following equivalences are true: 
T*/=BF = T* bLZ?F 
T*&clBF -_ T*/=lLBE 
It is immediately clear from the above definition that, like in Moore’s AEL, for any 
formula F of KL,B and for any static autoepistemic expansion T* we have: 
T* k CF iff T* /= F: (11) 
In other words, LF holds in the static expansion T* if and only if F is logically derivable 
from T*. 
Moreover, for any formula F of KL,B and for any static autoepistemic expansion T* 
we have: 
T* /= BF if T* /===,i, F; (12) 
thus a formula F is believed in a static expansion expansion T* if it is minimally entailed 
by T*. 
Consequently, the definition of static expansions formally enforces the intended mean- 
ing of introspective atoms described in the previous subsection. In general, the converse 
of (12) does not hold because belief atoms may be forced in by the theory itself. 
For example, the theory T = {u V b, Ba} has a consistent static expansion in which 
Bu, B( a V b), f3( ~a V -6) hold and yet T Fntin a. However, in rational knowledge and 
belief theories, i.e., those in which belief atoms do not occur positively, the converse is 
also true. Intuitively, rational theories are those theories in which beliefs BF cannot be 
explicitly stated but can be only implicitly inferred by virtue of minimal entailment of 
the underlying formulae F. 
Theorem 2.10. (Meaning of knowledge and belief atoms) Let T* be a stutic autoepis- 
temic expansion of a rational knowledge and belief theory T. For any formula F of KLJ 
we have 
T* + BF ifs T* kmin E 
TX k LF iff TX /= E 
Proof. If T* is inconsistent then there is nothing to prove. Let M be any model of T* 
and let M’ be its modification obtained by making any belief atom BF true in M’ if and 
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only if T* k;mjn F. It suffices to show that M’ is also a model of T* = Cn, (T U {LF 1 
T* + F} u (4F 1 T* F F} U {BF 1 T* kmin F}). 
Since belief atoms occur only negatively in clauses of T and since M’ contains no 
more belief atoms than M, we immediately conclude that M’ is also a model of T and 
therefore M’ is also a model of T’ = T U {CF ) T* /= F} U {-CF ) T* p F} U {BF ) 
T* kmin F}. In d t or er o verify that M’ is a model of T* = Cn, (T’) it suffices to note 
that all instances of the normality axiom B( F 3 C) A BF > (BG) also hold in M’. q 
Corollary 2.11. If T is a rational knowledge and belief theory then for any formula F 
of Ic~,u we have 
Stat(T) k 23F i# Stat(T) ktin E 
Stat(T) k LF iff Stat(T) k E 
The above results precisely clarify the meaning of knowledge and belief atoms in 
static expansions of rational theories. We now return to the simple example discussed 
in the Introduction. 
Example 2.12. Consider the knowledge and belief theory T discussed in the Introduc- 
tion: 
B~baseball A &football > rent-movie 
TCbaseball A -4football> dontbuy-tickets, 
This theory has a unique (consistent) static autoepistemic expansion (we use obvious 
abbreviations) : 
T* = Stat(T) = Cn, (T U {&bball, B-$ball, Xbball, 4jbal1, 
Lrmovie, Cdb_tickets, . . .}) , 
in which you rent a movie, because you believe that you will not go to watch any games 
(i.e., both lbaseball and Ifootball hold in all minimal models) and you do not buy 
any tickets because you don’t know that you will go to watch any of the games (i.e., 
neither baseball nor football are provable). (Here and in the rest of the paper we list 
only the “relevant” introspective atoms belonging to the expansion T*, skipping, e.g., 
Bdontbuy-tickets, L&baseball, etc.) 
Suppose now that you learn that you either go to a baseball game or to a football 
game, i.e., suppose that we add the Claus: 
baseball V football 
to T obtaining the theory Tz. Now T2 has a unique (consistent) static autoepistemic 
expansion 
T; = Cn, (T U {a( bball Vflall), B( Tbball V lfball) , Xbball, 4fbal1, 
B-r-movie, Ldb_tickets, . . .)), 
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in which you believe you should not rent a movie. Indeed, we know that T; + 
baseball V football and thus T; /= B(basebal1 V football). From (6), we infer that 
T; k 43~baseball V 4Tfootball. As a result rentmovie is false in all minimal models 
of T; and consequently T; b &rent_movie. 
However, you still do not buy any tickets, because you don’t know yet which game 
you are going to watch, i.e., neither baseball nor football are provable in T;. 
Finally, suppose that you learn that you actually go to watch a baseball game. After 
adding the clause 
baseball 
to T2, the new theory Tj has a unique (consistent) static autoepistemic expansion 
consisting of 
TT = Cn, (T U (t3bbal1, Blfball, Cbball, 4..all, &r-movie, &db_tickets, . . .}) , 
in which you still believe you should not rent any movies but you no longer be- 
lieve in not buying tickets because you now know that you are going to watch a 
specific game. Indeed, Tq k baseball and thus T$ /= abaseball. From (5) we ob- 
tain TT b -43Tbaseball and thus rent-movie is false in all minimal models of T$. 
Consequently TT + hrentmovie. Similarly, since TT /= Cbaseball we deduce that 
Tq ktin -dontduy_tickets and therefore TT k &dontduy_tickets. 
As we can see, the static semantics assigned to the discussed knowledge and belief 
theories by their unique consistent static autoepistemic expansions seems to fully agree 
with their intended meaning. Observe, that we cannot replace the premise &baseball A 
Blfootball in the first clause by CTbaseball A Clfootball because that would result 
in rentmovie not being true in T*. Similarly, we cannot replace it by 4baseball A 
4football because that would result in rent-movie becoming true in TT. We also cannot 
replace the premise 4baseballA Xfootball in the second implication by 43baseball A 
-3football or by &baseball A &football, because it would no longer imply that we 
should not buy tickets in T;. Thus the roles of the two operators are quite different and 
one cannot be substituted9 by the other. 
2.3. Embeddability of autoepistemic logic and circumscription 
We conclude this section by showing that propositional circumscription and Moore’s 
autoepistemic logic are isomorphically embeddable into the Autoepistemic Logic of 
Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB. In the following sections we will demonstrate that ma- 
jor semantics for normal and disjunctive logic programs (e.g., well-founded, stable, 
stationary and static semantics [ 11,12,26,29,34] ) as well as Gelfond’s epistemic spec- 
ifications [lo] are also embeddable into AELB. 
Since the first part of the definition of static autoepistemic expansions is identical to 
the definition of stable autoepistemic expansions in Moore’s autoepistemic logic, AEL, 
9 In this particular example, adding to the theory the axiom PIA discussed in Section 4.3 can make the two 
operators behave identically, However. the axiom PIA is very strong and in general its addition could lead to 
undesirable results. 
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it is not surprising that AEL is properly embeddable into the autoepistemic logic of 
knowledge and beliefs, AELB. However, the proof of this result is by no means trivial. 
Theorem 2.13. (Embeddability of autoepistemic logic) Let T be any autoepistemic 
theory in the language KL, i.e., any theory that does not use belief atoms BE 
l For every consistent static autoepistemic expansion T** of T in AELB its restriction 
T* = T’* [KL to the language KL is a consistent stable expansion of T in AEL. 
l Conversely, for every consistent stable autoepistemic expansion T* of T in AEL 
there is a unique consistent static autoepistemic expansion T** of T in AELB such 
that T* = T**IKL. 
Proof. Let T be any autoepistemic theory in the language KL, i.e., any theory that does 
not use belief atoms BF. Suppose first that Too 1s a consistent static autoepistemic 
expansion of T in AELB in the language KL,B, i.e., 
Too = CnFL,B (T U {L?F 1 F E KL,J and Too kmin F} 
U {CF 1 F E KLJ and Too + F} 
U {-CF 1 F E KLJ and To0 F F}). 
Here, given a language Yl we denote by CnN (respectively, Cny) the restriction of the 
operator Cn (respectively, Cn,) to the language X. Let To = T”‘lK~ be the restriction 
of Too to the language KL. Clearly, TO is consistent. Moreover, it is easy to see that, 
due to the fact that Too is obtained from To by adding some (introspective) atoms, for 
any formula F from KL we have that Too k F if and only if TO + F. This implies that 
and shows that To is a consistent stable expansion of T in AEL which completes the 
proof of the first part of the theorem. 
Before proving the second part of Theorem 2.13 we will need some additional notation 
and two lemmas. Given a propositional language 3-1 let us denote by I3( 3-1) (respectively, 
C(R)) its extension obtained by closing it under the belief (respectively, knowledge) 
operator. 
Lemma 2.14. Suppose that 7-i is a propositional language and T and To are consistent 
theories in 7-l such that 
To = Cn? (T U {!3F I L3F E 7-t and To k=min F} 
U{CF\fZFE’FIandT’+F} 
U (7L.F I CF E 7-l and To ‘+ F}). 
There is a unique consistent extension C( To) of the theory To in the language L( 7-l) 
such that C( TO) [l-t = To and moreover 
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L(7’O) = C~Z~‘~~(TU {BF 1 BF E L(Z) and L(T”) krnin F} 
U {LF 1 LF E L(7-l) and L(TO) /= F} 
U (1LF 1 LF E L(1-I) and L(TO) k F}). 
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of the result establishing the existence of a 
unique stable autoepistemic expansion of an objective theory [ 211 and thus it is only 
sketched in here. 
Let 7’0 = To and suppose that T,, was already constructed for some natural 12. Let 
T n+~ = MT, u {LF I Tn I= F} u {-CF I Tn F F}), 
where the Fs range over all formulae which involve at most II levels of nesting of the 
knowledge operator L and the standard closure Cn is taken over the language C( 7-l). It 
is easy to see that the theory 
L(T’) = u T, 
n<o 
satisfies the required condition. 0 
Lemma 2.15. Suppose that l-l is a propositional language and T and To are consistent 
theories in 7-t such that 
To = Cn: (T U {BF / BF E ‘FI and To ~min F} 
u{LFICFUbzdT”/=F} 
u {TLF / LF E 7-l and To k F}). 
There is a unique consistent extension B(T”) of the 
such that B(T’) 17-l = To and moreover 
theory To in the language t3(‘H) 
B(T’) = Cnf’xH’ (T U {BF 1 BF E B(K) and f3(T”) ktin F} 
u {CF ) LF E 8(7-l) and Z3(T”) /= F} 
U (1CF I CF E B(Z) and B(T’) k F}). 
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of the previous lemma and thus it is only 
sketched in here. 
Let TO = To and suppose that T, was already constructed for some natural n. Let 
T n+~ = Cn*(G U {BF I Tn kmin F)), 
where the Fs range over all formulae which involve at most n levels of nesting of the 
belief operator t3. It is easy to see that the theory 
&To> = u T,, 
IlCW 
satisfies the required condition. q 
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Suppose now that To is a consistent stable autoepistemic expansion of T in AEL. 
Since the language ‘l-l = KL does not contain any belief atoms, from the definition of 
stable expansions it follows that 
Let To = To and 7-& = ti and suppose that T, and 3-1, are already defined. If IZ is even 
then T,,, = Z?(T,) and ?-&,+I = B(‘H,,), where B(T,,) is given by Lemma 2.15. If n is 
odd then T,,+I = L(T,,) and 7-&+1 = C(IFI,,), where C(T,,) is given by Lemma 2.14. Since 
T,,, (‘If, = T,,, for every n, the sequence of theories {T,,} is nondecreasing. Moreover, 
each theory T,, is consistent and satisfies 
T,, = Cn~” (T u {BF 1 t3F E ‘If,, and T, kmin F} 
u {CF 1 CF E 7-l,, and T,, b F} 
U {-CF j CF E ‘FI, and T, k F}). 
Let Too = U,,,, T,,. Clearly, T ‘* is consistent and To = Too)K~. It suffices therefore to 
show that Too is a static autoepistemic expansion of T in AELB in the language ICL,B, 
i.e., that it satisfies the equation 
Too = CnF-, (T U (L3F ( F E KL,B and Too kmin F) 
U {CF j F E K,_B and Too k F} 
U { 4F I F E KL,B and Too F F}) 
and that Too is a unique such static expansion of T. We first show that 
Too 2 CnFL.I( (T U {BF 1 F E K:L,J and Too bmin F} 
U (LF ( F E KL,~ and Too /= F} 
U { -dF I F E KL,J and Too p F}) . 
Suppose that F E KL,B and Too k F. Th ere must exist an II such that T, k F and 
rSF E N,,. Then T, k CF and therefore LF E Too. Suppose that F E KL,B and Too F F. 
There must exist an n such that LF E 7-l,, and obviously T, ‘# F. Then T, k 4F and 
therefore SF E Too. 
As a union of theories closed under the axioms (D) and (K), Too is also closed 
under these axioms. Suppose that F E KL,J and Too bmin F. There must exist an n 
such that BF E ‘l-l,,. Moreover, as we show below, T, krnin F and therefore T, j= t3F 
which shows that l3F E Too. 
To see that T, kmin F suppose that M is a minimal model of T, and let M’ be any 
model of Too. Let N be an interpretation which coincides with A4 when restricted to the 
language X,, and coincides with M’ otherwise. Since Too is obtained from T, by adding 
some (introspective) atoms, it is easy to see that N is a model of Too. If N was not 
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a minimal model of Too then there would exist a smaller model N’ whose restriction 
to the language ‘FI, would then be a smaller model of T, which is not possible. Thus 
N b F which implies that M b F and shows that T, kmin F. 
In order to establish the opposite inclusion, it suffices to show that for every II: 
T, C Cr~t~,~ (T U {f?F 1 F E KL,B and Too brnin F} 
U {CF ) F E IcL,~ and Too k F} 
U { -CF 1 F E K& and To0 F F}) . 
This, however, follows easily by induction from the definition of T, and from the 
following two observations: 
l Due to the fact that Too is obtained from TO by adding some (introspective) atoms, 
for any formula F from a,, we have that Too k F if and only if T,, k F. 
l An argument similar to the one used in the previous paragraph establishes that for 
any formula F from ‘H,, we have that Too brnin F if and only if T,, kmin F. 
This shows that Too is a static expansion of T. 
To complete the proof it suffices to prove that 7”’ is a unique static expansion of 
T extending To. If this was not the case then we would be able to find a different 
static expansion TX of T and the first n such that T, C T* but T,+l g TX. However, 
the existence of such an n would violate the uniqueness of the extensions C(T*) and 
f3(T”), guaranteed by the Lemmas 2.15 and 2.14. 0 
Theorem 2.13 shows that the restriction, AELBIKL, of the autoepistemic logic of 
knowledge and beliefs, AELB, to the language KL, i.e., its restriction to theories using 
only the knowledge operator C, is isomorphic to Moore’s autoepistemic logic, AEL. 
Thus, as its acronym suggests, AELB indeed constitutes an extension of Moore’s AEL 
obtained by adding the belief operator 8. 
The above result has a corollary showing that any consistent objective theory has a 
unique consistent static expansion. 
Corollary 2.16. (Static expansions of objective theories) Any consistent objective the- 
ory T, i.e., a theory which does not contain any introspective atoms CF and I3E has a 
unique consistent static expansion T* = Stat(T) . 
Moreover, an objective formula F is logically implied by T if and only if the knowledge 
atom .!ZF belongs to T*: 
T+F=T*j=F=T*kCCE 
Similarly, an objective formula F is minimally entailed by T if and only if the belief 
atom I3F belongs to T*: 
T kti,, F :: T* +=min F - T* k BE 
Proof. It is known that any consistent objective theory T has a unique consistent stable 
autoepistemic expansion T* [ 2 11. By the previous theorem, there is a unique static 
expansion T** of T such that T* = T**IKL. If T had another consistent static expansion 
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T*** then its restriction to /CL would have to coincide with TX and thus T*** would 
have to coincide with TX*. 
In any static expansion T** k F G T** /= CF, for any formula F. Moreover, since 
T is rational, it follows from Theorem 2.10 that T** bmin F = T** b BF, for any 
formula F. 
Let F be any objective formula. Clearly, if T k F then also T** k F. Suppose that 
T** + F and T p F. Then there is a model M of T in which F is false. Let N be 
any model of T** and let N’ be its modification obtained by replacing its valuation of 
objective atoms by the one from M. Since T** differs from Cn(T) only by the addition 
of some introspective atoms and since those atoms do not appear in T it follows that N’ 
is also a model of T** in which F is false which is impossible. 
Clearly, if T ktin F then also T** k=min F. Suppose that T*” kmin F and T Fti,, F. 
Then there is a minimal model M of T in which F is false. Let N be any model 
of T** and let N’ be its modification obtained by replacing its valuation of objective 
atoms by the one from M. Since T** differs from Cn(T) only by the addition of some 
introspective atoms and since those atoms do not appear in T it follows that N’ is also 
a minimal model of T** in which F is false which is impossible. 0 
From the above proposition we immediately conclude that propositional circumscrip- 
tion (and thus also CWA, GCWA and ECWA [ 13,19,31] ) is properly embeddable into 
AELB. 
Corollary 2.17. (Embeddability of circumscription) Propositional circumscription is 
properly embeddable into the autoepistemic logic of knowledge and beliefs, AELB. More 
precisely, if T is any consistent objective theory, i.e., a theory which does not contain 
any introspective atoms CF and BF, then T has a unique consistent static expansion 
TX = Stat(T) and any objective formula F is logically implied by the circumscription 
CIRC( T) of T [f and only if the belief atom BF belongs to T*: 
CIRC(T) b F = T* k BF - Stat(T) k f?F 
Proof. This follows immediately from the previous corollary and the fact that for an 
objective theory T we have T btin F E CIRC(T) k F. 0 
3. Autoepistemic logic of beliefs 
While the restriction AELBl KL of AELB to the language KL is isomorphic to Moore’s 
autoepistemic logic, AEL, the restriction AELBIKB of AELB to the language Ke, i.e., 
its restriction to theories using only the belief operator I3, constitutes an entirely new 
logic, which will be called the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs and will be denoted by 
AEB. We call theories restricted to the language KB belief theories. 
The following table illustrates the relationships between the three autoepistemic logics 
discussed in the paper: 
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AELB 
AEL 
AEB 
Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs 
Autoepistemic Logic (of Knowledge) 
Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs 
AELBJKL 
AELB 1 KB 
It turns out that AEB has some quite natural and interesting properties. In partic- 
ular, every belief theory T in AEB has the least (in the sense of inclusion) static 
expansion T which is called the static completion of T. Static completion 7 has 
an iterative definition as the least fixed point of a monotonic belief closure oper- 
ator Pr defined below. Although static completions may, in general, be inconsis- 
tent theories, we will show that they are in fact consistent for all a@rmative belief 
theories. These properties of static expansions in the Autoepistemic Logic of Be- 
liefs, AEB, sharply contrast with the properties of stable autoepistemic expansions in 
AEL which do not admit natural least fixed point definitions and, in general, do not 
have least elements. For completeness we include in this section some results pre- 
viously established in the paper [29] which was limited to the study of logic pro- 
grams. 
The definition of static autoepistemic expansions in AEB is the same as in AELB 
except that it is restricted to the language of Ka: 
Definition 3.1. (Static autoepistemic expansions in AEB) A belief theory T’ is called 
a static autoepistemic expansion of a belief theory T in AEB if it satisfies the following 
fixed-point equation, 
T*=Cn,(TU{BFIT* kmi,F}), 
where F ranges over all formulae of KB 
As shown by the following result, which is analogous to Theorem 2.13, the restriction 
to the language of Ka does not constitute any limitation because any static expansion 
T* of a belief theory T in AEB can be uniquely extended to a static expansion T** of 
T in AELB (and vice versa) : 
Theorem 3.2. (Embeddability of autoepistemic logic of beliefs) Let T be any belief 
theory in the language KB, i.e., any theory that does not use knowledge atoms CE 
l For every consistent static autoepistemic expansion T** of T in AELB its restriction 
T* = T’*IKB to the language KB is a consistent static expansion of T in AEB. 
l Conversely, for every consistent static autoepistemic expansion T* of T in AEB 
there is a unique consistent static autoepistemic expansion T** of T in AELB such 
that TX = T**IKB. 
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.13. Let T be any belief theory 
in the language KB, i.e., any theory that does not use knowledge atoms LF. Suppose 
first that Too is a consistent static autoepistemic expansion of T in AELB in the language 
KL.B, i.e., 
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T O” = Cr@.’ (T U {BF 1 F E KL,B and Too ~=min F} 
u {LF 1 F E ICLJ and Too k F} 
U (4.F 1 F E KL,B and Too ‘$ F}). 
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As before, given a language 8 we denote by Cnw (respectively, Cn:) the restriction 
of the operator Crz (respectively, Or,) to the language 7-L Let To = ToolK~ be the 
restriction of Too to the language KB. Clearly, To is consistent. Moreover, it is easy to 
see that, due to the fact that Too is obtained from To by adding some (introspective) 
atoms, for any formula F from Kn we have that Too kmin F if and only if To ktin F. 
This implies that 
To = C~Z$~ (T U (l3F ( F E IcB and To k,,+,, F}) 
and shows that To is a consistent stable expansion of T in AEB which completes the 
proof of the first part of the theorem. 
Suppose now that To is a consistent static autoepistemic expansion of T in AEB. As 
before, given a propositional language ‘FI we denote by B(N) (respectively, C(N) ) 
its extension obtained by closing it under the belief (respectively, knowledge) operator. 
Since the language ‘H = ICe does not contain any knowledge atoms, from the definition 
of static expansions it follows that 
T”=Cn~(TU{13F\13FE3-1andTo~ti~F} 
U{CF)CF~%andT”/==F} 
U {-LF / CF E 7-l and To p F}). 
Let To = To and Xc = ‘H and suppose that T,, and IFI,, are already defined. If n is odd then 
T ,,+I = B(T,,) and ‘Hn+i = B(X,,), where B(T,,) is given by Lemma 2.15. If n is even 
then T,+I = C(T,) and ?-&,+I = C(‘H,), where L(T,) is given by Lemma 2.14. Since 
Tn+l)‘Rn = T,, for every n, the sequence of theories {T,} is nondecreasing. Moreover, 
each theory T,, is consistent and satisfies 
T, = Cn? (T U {BF ( 13F E 7fFI, and T, b=min F} 
U {CF 1 CF E IFI,, and T,, k F} 
U{TCF(CFE?&,~~~T,FF}). 
Let Too = U,,, T,. Clearly, Too is consistent and TV = T”*IK~. It suffices therefore to 
show that Too is a static autoepistemic expansion of T in AELB in the language KL,~, 
i.e., that it satisfies the equation 
Too = CnFL,D (T U (l3F / F E KL,B and Too +;min F} 
U{LF I F E KL,B and Too + F} 
U (-4F ) F E KL,B and Too k F}) 
and that Too is a unique such static expansion of T. The proof of this fact is identical 
to that given in the proof Theorem 2.13. 0 
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Definition 3.3. (Static semantics of belief theories) By the static semantics Stat(T) 
of a belief theory T in AEB we mean the set of all formulae that belong to all static 
autoepistemic expansions T* of T in AEB. 
It follows from Theorem 3.2 that the static semantics of a belief theory T in AEB is 
just the restriction to the language KS of the static semantics of T in AELB. By abuse of 
notation, we use the same symbol Stat(T) to denote both of them. From Theorem 3.2 
and Corollary 2. I6 we immediately obtain: 
Corollary 3.4. (Static expansions of objective theories in AEB) Any consistent objective 
theory T, i.e., a theory which does not contain any introspective atoms .LF and BE has 
a unique consistent static expansion T* in AEB. 
Moreover, an objective formula F is minimally entailed by T if and only if the belief 
atom BF belongs to T*: 
From Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 2.17 we also conclude that propositional circum- 
scription (and thus also CWA, GCWA and ECWA [ 13,19,31] ) is properly embeddable 
into AEB. 
Corollary 3.5. (Embeddability of circumscription into AEB) Propositional circumscrip- 
tion is properly embeddable into the autoepistemic logic of beliefs, AEB. More precisely, 
if T is any consistent objective theory, i.e., a theory which does not contain any intro- 
spective atoms CF and i3F then T has a unique consistent static expansion T* in AEB 
and any objective formula F is logically implied by the circumscription CIRC(T) of T 
if and only if the belief atom BF belongs to T*: 
CIRC(T) i= F = T* + BE 0 
We now introduce the belief closure operator PT. 
Definition 3.6. (Belief closure operator) For any belief theory T define the belief clo- 
sure operator WT by the formula 
WT(S) =Cn*(TU {BF / S kmin F}), 
where S is an arbitrary belief theory and the Fs range over all formulae of ICa. 
Thus P,(S) augments the theory T with all those belief atoms l3F with the property 
that F is minimally entailed by S. We begin with the following easy observation. 
Proposition 3.7. A theory T” is a static autoepistemic expansion of the belief theory T 
in AEB if and only if T’ is a fixed point of the operator !pr, i.e., if T* = wr(T*>. 
Proof. Theory T* is a fixed point of the operator WT if T* = wT(T*> = Cn, (T U {BF 1 
T*ktinF}) h’h’ w tc IS equivalent to T* being a static expansion of T in AEB. 0 
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Consequently, in order to show that every belief theory has the least static expansion 
we need to prove that the operator pr has the least fixed point. We first establish the 
(restricted) monotonicity of the OperatOr PT. 
Proposition 3.8. (Monotonicity of the belief closure operator) The operator PT is 
monotonic. More precisely, suppose that the theories V’ and V” are extensions of T 
obtained by adding some belief atoms BF to T and let T’ = Cn, (V’) and T” = Cn, ( Vtt) 
Zf T’ & T” then PT(T’) c Pr(T”). 
Proof. Suppose that V’ = T U {BF,, 1 s E St}, V” = T U {BFS / s E S”}, where St and 
S” are some sets of indices, and let T’ = Cn,( V’) and T” = Cn, (V”). We have to 
show that pT(T’) C pr(T”). Since Cn,( V’) 2 Cn,( V”) we can clearly assume that 
S’ C 9’. It suffices to show that if T’ btin F then T” k=min F.
Suppose that T’ kmin F and let A4 be an arbitrary minimal model of T”. Since 
V’ 2 V” and V’ and V” differ only on the set of belief atoms and since minimal models 
do not minimize belief atoms, M is also a minimal model of V’ and thus also a minimal 
model of T’. We conclude that M k F and therefore T” krnin F. q 
Using Propositions 3.7 and 3.8 we can easily adapt the proof of the well-known 
Theorem of Tarski, ensuring the existence of least fixed points of monotonic operators, 
to obtain: 
Theorem 3.9. (Least static expansion) Every belief theory T in AEB has the least static 
expansion, namely, the least fixed point T of the monotonic belief closure operator PT. 
Moreover, the least static expansion T of a belief theory T can be constructed as 
follows. Let p = Cn, (T) and suppose that Ta has already been de3ned for any ordinal 
number (Y < f3. If p = a + 1 is a successor ordinal then define lo 
T nf1 =Pr(T”) = Cn,(TU {BF 1 T” /==mjn F}), 
where F ranges over all formulae in KB. Else, if B is a limit ordinal then define 
Tp= T”. U n<P 
The sequence {Ta} is monotonically increasing and thus has a unique fixed point 
‘T = TA = PT( T*), for some ordinal A. 
Proof. From Proposition 3.8 it easily follows that the sequence {Ta} is monotonically 
increasing and thus has a unique fixed point T = TA = WT(T’), for some ordinal 
A. This fixed point must therefore be the least fixed point of the operator WT. From 
Proposition 3.7 we infer that any fixed point of the operator pr is a static expansion 
of T. q 
“’ Since the sequence {F} is monotonically nondecreasing we can equivalently define Tp = Cn, ( Ta U {BF ( 
7-O km,, F)). 
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The existence of least static autoepistemic expansions of theories in AEB sharply 
contrasts with the properties of stable autoepistemic expansions in AEL which typically 
do not have least elements. 
Definition 3.10. (Static completion) The least static expansion T of a belief theory T 
is called the static completion of T. 
Since the static completion of a belief theory T is obtained by augmenting T with the 
least possible number of belief atoms BF, it can be viewed as the most skeptical among 
static expansions (see [ 141). Observe also that the least static autoepistemic expansion 
of T contains those and only those formulae which are true in all static autoepistemic ex- 
pansions of T and thus, like Clark’s predicate completion comp( P) of a logic program P, 
the static completion T of a belief theory T describes the static semantics Stat(T) of T. 
Corollary 3.11. For any belief theory T, the static completion T of T coincides with the 
static semantics Stat(T) of T in AEB. 0 
The fact that the static semantics of belief theories in AEB can be constructed by means 
of the iterative minimal model procedure described in Theorem 3.9 is quite important. 
As a result, static semantics not only has an elegant fixed point characterization but it can 
simply be viewed as the iterated minimal model semantics. The last fact is important 
from the procedural point of view. Namely, once a suitable procedure is devised to 
compute the minimal model semantics, it can then be iteratively applied to compute the 
static semantics. 
Remark 3.12. It is easy to see that if the belief theory is$nite then the construction of 
the least static expansion will stop after countably many steps. However, the following 
powerful and somewhat surprising result obtained recently in [9] shows that for every 
finite belief theory T its least static expansion is in fact obtained by a single iteration 
of the operator PT. 
Theorem 3.13. (Brass et al. [ 91) Let T be any finite belief theory. The least static 
expansion of T is always obtained by a single iteration of the operator ?PT. In other 
words, the static completion T of T coincides with p~( T) : 
The following theorem significantly extends Theorem 3.9 and provides a complete 
characterization of all static autoepistemic expansions of a belief theory T in the language 
KB. 
Theorem 3.14. (Characterization theorem) A theory T’ is a static autoepistemic ex- 
pansion of a theory T in AEB if and only if T* is the least static autoepistemic expansion 
p of u theory T’ = T U {BF, 1 s E S} satisfying the condition that T* ktin &, for every 
s E S. In particular, the least static autoepistemic expansion T of T is obtained when 
the set {13Fs 1 s E S} is empty. 
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Proof. (=s) Suppose that T* is a static expansion of T. Then 
T’ = Cn,(T U {BF 1 T* kmi, F}). 
Let T’ = T u {BF 1 T* k.min F}. It suffices to show that T* is the least static expansion 
T’ of T’. Clearly, T* is a static expansion of T’ because 
T* = Cn,(T'U{BF 1 T" +-,&). 
Since T’ = Cn,(T’) it is also the least static expansion of T’. 
(+=) Suppose now that T* is the static completion T U {f3Fs / s E S} of a belief 
theory T’ = T U {f3Fy 1 s E S} which satisfies the condition that T* kmjn Fy, for every 
s E S. Since T* is the (least) static expansion of the belief theory T U {f3~? I s E S} we 
have 
T*=Cn,(TU{BF,/sES}U{L?FIT*~,i,F}). 
Since T* +=min Fy, for every s E S we obtain 
T* = Cn,(T U {BF I T* b-,i, F}), 
which shows that T* is a static expansion of T. 0 
According to the above theorem, in order to find a static expansion T’ of a belief 
theory T one needs to: 
l Select a set {f3FY 1 s E S} of beliefs. 
l Construct the static completion T’ = T U {BF’, / s E S} of the augmented belief 
theory T’ = T U {BF, / s E S}, e.g., by using the iterative fixed point definition 
from Theorem 3.9. 
l Show that T* kmin F,, for every s E S. 
It is the first part, namely, the selection (or guessing) of the set of beliefs {BF’ I s E 
S}, that is most difficult. However, one can always choose the empty set to obtain the 
least static expansion (or static completion) ? of the belief theory T. 
Theorem 3.9 also immediately implies: 
Corollary 3.15. (Greatest static expansion) Every belief theory T in AEB has the 
greatest static expansion which is always an inconsistent theory. 
Proof. Let T’ = T U {B(A A -A)}, where A is an arbitrary atom. It is easy to see 
that T’ is inconsistent. Indeed, since any theory logically implies A V 1A we infer that 
B( A V 1A) belongs to T”. Consequently, by the Consistency Axiom, -B( A A --IA) also 
belongs to T* which shows that T” is inconsistent. Since T* is inconsistent, T* k Ar\yA, 
which, by Theorem 3.9, implies that T* is a stationary expansion of T. I3 
It is time now to discuss some examples. For simplicity, unless explicitly needed, when 
describing static expansions we will ignore nested beliefs and list only those elements 
of the expansion that are “relevant” to our discussion, thus, for example, skipping such 
members of the expansion as B( F V -F), l3l3( F V lF), etc. 
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Example 3.16. Consider the following belief theory T: 
Car A &Broken > ShouldRun 
Damaged A B-Fixed > Broken 
Car 
Damaged. 
In order to iteratively compute its static completion 7; we let p = Cn, (T) . Clearly, 
7’(’ /= CarADamaged and one easily checks that p btin TFixed. Indeed, in order to find 
minimal models of p we need to assign arbitrary truth values to belief atoms %Broken 
and a-Fixed and then minimize the objective atoms Fixed, ShouldRun, Broken. We 
easily see that p has the following four (classes of) minimal models (truth values of 
the remaining belief atoms are irrelevant and are therefore skipped): 
MI = (&Broken, a-Fixed, Car, Damaged, ShouldRun, Broken, TFixed}, 
M2 = (&Broken, 4GFixed, Car, Damaged, ShouldRun, TBroken, TFixed}, 
M3 = { GLBroken, &Fixed, Car, Damaged, +houldRun, Broken, TFixed}, 
M4 = {+-Broken, -U-Fixed, Car, Damaged, GhouldRun, TBroken, TFixed}. 
Since in all of them Fixed is false we deduce that 7’a k=,i, -Fixed. Consequently, if 
we define 
T’ = !Pr(p) = Cn,(TU {UF 1 p b=min F}), 
T’ = Cn,(T U {Xar, aDamaged, &Fixed,. . .}). 
We continue the iterative procedure by defining 
T2 = !PT(T’) = Cn,(T U {BF 1 T’ kmin F}) 
Since T’ + Broken we conclude that 
T2 = Cn, (T U {BCar, BDamaged, aTFixed, l3Broken,. . .}). 
By the Consistency Axiom ( l), T2 k 43TBroken and therefore T* kmi, 4houldRun. 
Accordingly, if we define 
T3 = P,r(T2) = Cn,(T U {BF 1 T2 I=,i” F}), 
then we obtain 
T” = Cn, (T U {BCar, ODamaged, &Fixed, BBroken, &ShouldRun, . .}). 
It is easy to see that no other belief atom of the form BL, where L is an ob- 
jective literal, belongs to T’ and that T3 = 9’r(T3) is a fixed point of 3Vr (we 
recall that for simplicity we ignore here nested beliefs). Consequently, 7; = T3 = 
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Cn, (T U {DCur, BDamaged, &Fixed, 23Broken, f?4houldRun,. . .}) is the static com- 
pletion of T. The static semantics of T asserts therefore that the car is believed to be 
broken, unfixed and not in a running condition. Using Theorem 3.14 one easily verifies 
that T does not have any other (consistent) static expansions. 
Example 3.17. Consider now the following belief theory T reflecting the anxieties of a 
guy living in Southern California who, while visiting Europe, was informed by a friend 
that apparently yet another disaster occurred in California. The European friend was not 
quite sure, however, whether it was an earthquake or fires: 
&Earthquake A &Fires > Calm 
t3( Earthquake V Fires) > Worried 
BEarthquake A t3Fires > Panicked 
BCalm > CallHome 
Earthquake V Fires. 
In order to iteratively compute the static completion 7 we let Te = Cn,(T). Clearly, 
p b Earthquake V Fires and one easily checks that 7’a kmi, TEarthquake V TFires. 
Consequently, if we define 
T’ = WT(~) = Cn,(T U {BF / p bmin F}). 
T’ =Cn,(TU{B(EqVFi),B(~EqV~Fi),...}). 
Obviously, T’ + Worried. Moreover, by the Consistency and Conjunctive Belief 
Axioms, T2 /= -3Earthquake V 43Fires and T2 k 43~Earthquake V 43TFires and 
therefore T2 kmin Xalm and T2 +=min TPanicked. Accordingly, if we continue the 
iterative procedure by defining 
T2 = ?Pr(T’) = Cn,(TU {BF 1 T’ krnin F}). 
then we obtain 
T* = Cn, (T U {a( Eq V Fi) , B( ‘Eq V TFi) , kLCalm, &Panic, DWorried, . . .}). 
Clearly, T2 + CallHome and thus if we now define 
T3 = !&(T=) = Cn,(TU {BF 1 T= +=min F}), 
then we obtain 
T3 = Cn, (T U {a( Eq V Fi) , a( ‘Eq V -Fi) , &Calm, 
t?TPanic,BWorried, 13Cal1,. .}). 
It is easy to see that no other belief atom of the form 23L, where L is an ob- 
jective literal, belongs to T” and that T 3 = !Pr(T3) is a fixed point of Pr (we 
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again recall that for simplicity we ignore nested beliefs). Consequently, T = T3 = 
Cfz, (TU {a(Eq V Fi), a( ‘Eq V T?), &Calm, B~Panic, BWorried, BCall, . . .}) is the 
static completion of T. The static semantics of T asserts therefore that the guy is not 
calm, because he does not believe that none of the disasters took place, and thus he 
plans to call home and is worried. However, he is not exactly panicked because he has 
no reason to believe that both disasters struck. Using Theorem 3.14 one easily verifies 
that T does not have any other (consistent) static expansions. 
Observe one more time that we cannot replace the belief atoms in the clause 
&Earthquake A BTFires > Calm 
by the knowledge atoms 
TLEarthquake A 4Fires > Calm 
because this would imply that the individual is calm. The original clause also cannot be 
replaced by the clause 
CTEarthquake A CTFires > Calm 
because this would preclude the individual to be calm that unless he has a factual 
knowledge that no disaster actually took place rather than, as intended, just believe that 
nothing happened based on the lack of information to the contrary. 
Remark 3.18. According to Theorem 3.13, in both of the above examples static com- 
pletions are in fact obtained in just one iteration of the belief operator. However, in 
order to show it, one has to deal with nested beliefs and thus the explanation becomes 
a bit more complex. That is why we decided to illustrate a weaker fact that fixed points 
are obtained in several steps of iteration. 
Clearly, if we added TWorried to the previous theory T we would obtain a belief 
theory whose static completion is inconsistent because it implies both Worried and 
TWorried. The new theory not only appears to describe contradictory information but 
it also demonstrates that the static completion 7 of a consistent belief theory T may in 
fact be inconsistent. ” 
It follows from Theorem 3.9 and from Corollary 3.15 that a belief theory T either 
has a consistent least static expansion (i.e., static completion) 7 or it does not have 
any consistent static expansions at all, in which case its least and greatest static expan- 
sions coincide. However, it turns out that static completions are always consistent for 
afirmative belief theories, introduced in Definition 2.1. 
Theorem 3.19. (Consistency of static completions) The static completion T of any 
a&mative belief theory T in AEB is always consistent. 
” The papers [ 2,3 1 deal with contradiction removal in belief theories 
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Proof. We will prove by induction that T”, as defined in Theorem 3.9, is consistent, for 
every (Y. To see that p = Cn,(T) is consistent it suffices to take an interpretation of 
IcB in which all belief atoms are false and all objective atoms are true. 
Suppose that we already proved that T” is consistent, for any a < /3. If p is a limit 
ordinal then, by the Compactness Theorem, Tp must also be consistent as a union of an 
increasing sequence of consistent theories. If on the other hand /3 = (Y + 1 then 
Since T” is consistent, the class of formulae F minimally entailed by Ta also con- 
stitutes a consistent theory. Define an interpretation M so that all the objective atoms 
and all the belief atoms t?F such that T” bmi,, F are true in M while all the remaining 
belief atoms are false. Clearly M is a model of T U {DF 1 T” ktin F} and since it 
also clearly satisfies axioms ( I ) and (4) it is a model of Tp. We conclude that Tfi is 
consistent, which completes the inductive step. q 
4. Logic programs as knowledge and belief theories 
We already know that Propositional Circumscription, Moore’s Autoepistemic Logic, 
AEL, and the Autoepistemic Logic of Beliefs, AEB, are all properly embeddable into the 
Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB. We will now show that major 
semantics defined for normal and disjunctive logic programs are also easily embeddable 
into AELB. In the next section we will discuss yet another nonmonotonic formalism 
embeddable into AELB. 
Recall that by a disjunctive logic program (or a disjunctive deductive database) P 
we mean a set of informal clauses of the form 
A, V...VA/ + B, A... A B,,, AnotCi A...AnotC, (13) 
where 1 > 1; m, n > 0 and Ai, Bi and Cl’s are atomic formulae. If I = 1, for all 
clauses, then the program is called normal or nondisjunctive. As usual, we assume (see 
[23] ) that the program P has been already instantiated and thus all of its clauses 
(possibly infinitely many) are propositional. This assumption allows us to restrict our 
considerations to a fixed objective propositional language K. In particular, if the original 
(uninstantiated) program is finite and function-free then the resulting objective language 
K is also finite. 
Clauses (13) are informal because the negation symbol notC does not denote the 
classical negation -K of C but rather a nonmonotonic (common-sense) negation. More- 
over, the implication symbol + does not necessarily represent the standard material 
implication C. Various meanings can be associated with “not C” and “4” leading, in 
general, to different semantics for logic programs. We will now show that many of the 
proposed semantics can be obtained by translating the informal disjunctive logic pro- 
gram P into a formal knowledge and belief theory T(P) and thus assigning a specific 
meaning to the nonmonotonic negation notC and the implication symbol -+. We argue 
therefore that the Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Beliefs, AELB, constitutes a 
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broad and flexible semantic framework for logic programming which not only enables 
us to reproduce virtually all major semantics recently introduced for logic programs 
but also allows us to introduce new semantics, analyze their properties and study their 
mutual relationships. For a more extensive treatment of this subject the reader is referred 
to [9,28,29]. 
4.1. Stable semantics of normal programs 
Since Moore’s autoepistemic logic, AEL, is isomorphic to the subset AELB(KL of 
AELB, it follows from the results of Gelfond and Lifschitz [ 1 l] that stable semantics 
of normal logic programs can be obtained by means of a suitable translation of a logic 
program into a belief theory. Namely, for a normal logic program P consisting of 
clauses: 
A+-B, A...AB,,AnotC, A...AnotC, 
define T,r. (P) to be its translation into the (affirmative) knowledge and belief theory 
consisting of formulae: 
B, A . . A B,, A -CC, A . . . A -CC,, > A. 
The translation T,L(P) is obtained therefore by replacing the nonmonotonic negation 
not C by the negated knowledge atom -CC which gives it the intended meaning of “C 
is not known to be true”. In addition, we replace the informal implication symbol + by 
the standard material implication >. 
Theorem 4.1. (Embeddability of stable semantics) There is a one-to-one correspon- 
dence between stable models M of the program P and consistent static autoepistemic 
expansions T* of its translation T-r.(P) into belief theory. Namely, for any objective 
atom A we have 
AE M iff LAET* 
TAEM ifs TLAET*. 
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorem 2.13 and the results obtained in [ 111. 0 
4.2. Stationary and well-founded semantics of normal programs 
Similarly, since autoepistemic logic of beliefs, AEB, is isomorphic to the subset 
AELBIKB of AELB, it follows from the results obtained in [29] that the stationary (or, 
equivalently, partial stable) semantics, and, in particular, the well-founded semantics, of 
normal logic programs can be obtained by means of a suitable translation of a logic 
program into a knowledge and belief theory. Namely, for a normal logic program P 
consisting of clauses 
A +- B, A... AB,, AnotCI A...AnotC, 
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its translation into the (affirmative) belief theory Z’B~( P) is given by the set of the 
corresponding clauses: 
B, /I... A B,,, A BX, A . . A t34,, > A (14) 
obtained by replacing the nonmonotonic negation nat F by the belief atom SF and by 
replacing the implication symbol --f by the standard material implication 1. 
The translation, Ta_(P), gives therefore the following meaning to the nonmonotonic 
negation: 
not F dgf B-F z F is believed to be false z -F is minimally entailed 
and is patterned after the translation introduced earlier in [ 251. 
(15) 
Theorem 4.2. (Embeddability of stationary and well-founded semantics) There is a 
one-to-one correspondence between stationary (or, equivalently, partial stable) models 
M of the program P and consistent static autoepistemic expansions T* of its translation 
T~L( P) into a knowledge and belief theory. Namely, for any objective atom A we have 
A EM iff t3A ET* 
~AEM iff D-ACT*. 
Since the well-founded model MO of the program P coincides with the least stationary 
model of P [ 261, it corresponds to the static completion Ta_ (P) of Tn, (P) , whose 
existence is guaranteed by Theorem 3.9. 
Moreover, (total) stable models M of P correspond to those consistent static au- 
toepistemic expansions T* of T~_L (P) that satisfy the condition that for all objective 
atoms A, either BA E T* or B-A E T*. 
Proof. Follows immediately from Theorem 3.2 and the results obtained in [ 29). 0 
It is worth mentioning that for normal programs an analogous result applies to the 
translation T+(P) defined by 
B, A . . . A B,, A 43C, A . . A -t3C, > A. 
However, for disjunctive programs (discussed below) the two translations Ta7 (P) and 
T+(P) lead, in general, to different results. 
Example 4.3. It is easy to see that the belief theory T: 
Car A &Broken > ShouldRun 
Damaged A &Fixed > Broken 
Car 
Damaged. 
considered in Example 3.16 can be viewed as a translation Tn_( P) of the logic program 
P given by 
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ShouldRun + Car A notBroken 
Broken + Damaged A notFixed 
Car 
Damaged. 
The unique static expansion (or static completion), 
7 = Cn, (T U {BCar, l3Damaged, &Fixed, BBroken, EShouldRun, . . _}) . 
of T corresponds therefore to the unique stationary (or stable) model 
M = (Car, Damaged, TFixed, Broken, +ShouldRun, . . .} 
of P which is also its unique well-founded model. 
4.3. Semantics of disjunctive programs 
As we have shown above, major semantics proposed for normal logic programs can be 
naturally captured by means of a suitable translation of logic programs into knowledge 
and belief theories in AELB. We now extend these results to the class of disjunctive 
logic programs (see [ 17 ] for an overview of disjunctive logic programming). 
In particular, we can extend the transformation Tn._(P) to any disjunctive logic 
program P consisting of clauses 
Al V...VA, + B,,..., B ,,,, notCI,...,notC, 
by translating it into the (affirmative) autoepistemic theory consisting of formulae 
B, A . . A B,,, A &Cl A . . . A &C,, > A I v . . . v A/. 
It follows from the results obtained in [29] that this transformation immediately leads 
to the static semantics of disjunctive logic programs: 
Theorem 4.4. (Embeddability of static semantics) There is a one-to-one correspon- 
dence between static expansions P* of the disjunctive logic program P, as defined in 
[ 291, and consistent static autoepistemic expansions T* of its translation T = Tn, (P) 
into belief theory. Namely, a formula F belongs to P* if and only if BF belongs to T*. 
Proof. Immediate consequence of Theorem 3.2 and the results obtained in [ 291. 0 
Example 4.5. Consider the following disjunctive logic program P describing the state 
of mind of a person planning a trip to either Australia or Europe: 
GotoAustralia V Goto-Europe 
GotoBoth + GotoAustralia A Goto_Europe 
Save_hdoney t not GotoBoth 
CancelReservation + not GotoAustralia 
CancelReservation + not GotolZurope 
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and its translation into the (affirmative) belief theory T = Ta7 (P): 
GotoAustralia V Gotolkrope 
GotoAustralia A Gotolkope > GotoBoth 
LLGotoBoth 3 SaveMoney 
B-GotoAustralia 2 CancelReservation 
bGoto_Europe I CancelReservation. 
Let 7’” = Cn,(T) and assume obvious abbreviations. Clearly, in all minimal models of 
7’0 the disjunctions GA V GE and -GA V -GE hold true. Therefore, 
7’a kmin GA V GE, p k:min ?GA V -GE and Tc’ b.min 7GB 
and, consequently, 
T’ =PT(p) =Cn,(TU{B(GAVGE),f3(~GAV~GE),B~GB,...}) 
Now T’ /=,,, SM and thus 
It is easy to see that there is a minimal model of T2 in which B~GotoAustrulia is 
true and thus also CancelReservation is true. But there is also is a minimal model 
of T* in which both BTGotoAustralia and B-Goto_Europe are false and thus also 
CancelReservation is false. Consequently, 
T* kmin CR and T* pmin -CR. 
This leads to the conclusion that T” = WT(T*) = T2 is a fixed point and therefore the 
static completion T of T is given by 
7 = Cn, (T U {a( GA V GE), L3( -GA V TGE), BlGB, f3SM,, . .}). 
It establishes that the individual is expected to travel either to Australia or to Europe 
but is not expected to do both trips and thus will save money. One easily verifies that T 
does not have any other (consistent) static expansions. 
It is important to stress that CancelReservation is not a logical consequence of the 
static semantics 7 of the previously considered (translated) program T = Tt+ (P). This 
follows from the fact that the static completion T does not infer l2 B~GotoAustrulia V 
&Goto_Europe even though it derives a( TGoto-Australia ?/ yGoto_Europe). This re- 
flects the notion that from the fact that a disjunction F V G is believed to be true, one 
does not necessarily want to conclude that either F is believed or G is believed. In 
this particular case, we do not want to cancel our reservations to either Australia or to 
Europe until we find out precisely which one of them we will actually not visit. In other 
‘* However, by the Consistency Axiom ( I ), T implies the weaker formula: ~B(GoroAusrralia A 
Goto-Europe) E +3Gofr~Ausfdic~ V d3Goto_Europe. 
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words, we usually do not want to assume that the belief operator t3 is distributive with 
respect to disjunctions. However, one could easily ensure distributivity of beliefs with 
respect to disjunctions by assuming the following: 
Disjunctive Belief Axiom. For any formulae F and G: 
(DBA) B(FvC) =t3FvUG. 
This optional axiom states that our beliefs are distributive with respect to disjunctions. 
Note that, due to the Conjunctive Belief Axiom (4), our beliefs are always distributive 
with respect to conjunctions. 
Example 4.6. When augmented with the Disjunctive Belief Axiom, DBA, the static 
semantics of the (translated) program T = Tu-,( P) from Example 4.5: 
GotoAustralia V GotoEurope 
Goto_Australia A GotoEurope > GotoBoth 
t3TGotoBoth 3 SaveMoney 
B~GotoAustralia > CancelReservation 
&Goto-Europe > CancelReservation. 
implies CancelReservation. Indeed, belief theory T has a unique static expansion (static 
completion) T of T given by 
T= Cn,(TU {B(GA V GE),E(?GA V -GE),B~GB,KSM,BCR,.. .}), 
because now the axiom (DBA) implies B-GotoAustralia V ByGotoEurope. 
Observe also that the definition of static expansions and static completions carefully 
distinguishes between these formulae F which are known to be true in the expansion 
T* (i.e., those for which T* b F), and those formulae F which are only believed 
(i.e., those for which T* k BF). This important distinction not only increases the 
expressiveness of the language but is in fact quite crucial for many forms of reasoning. 
However, if we wanted to ensure that a formula F is always true whenever it is believed 
to be true we could use the following: 
Belief Closure Axiom. 
(BCA) LBF 3 F for any formula F. 
This optional axiom states that if a formula F is believed to be true (in a given expansion 
T*), i.e., if T* /= I3F then F is in fact true (in T*), i.e., T* k F. This is a powerful 
rule which, in essence, erases the distinction between facts believed to be true (in the 
expansion) and those which are actually true. 
Static semantics for disjunctive programs has a number of important advantages but 
it is not the only semantics for disjunctive programs that can be derived by means 
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of a suitable translation of a logic program into the autoepistemic logic of knowledge 
and beliefs, AELB. For example, we can also extend the transformation T+(P) to any 
disjunctive logic program P consisting of clauses 
A, v...vA/ c B ,,..., B ,,,, notC I,..., notC, 
by translating it into the (affirmative) autoepistemic theory consisting of formulae 
B,A.~.AB,,,A~CC,A.~~A~~C,,>AIV...VA~. 
It follows from the results obtained in [27] and from Theorem 2.13 that this trans- 
formation augmented with the following: 
Positive Introspection Axiom. For any objective atom A: 
(PIA) A > CA 
produces the disjunctive stable semantics originally defined in [ 12,261. This optional 
and rather strong axiom states that if A holds in some model of a given theory then A 
is known to be true, i.e., CA holds. 
Theorem 4.7. (Embeddability of disjunctive stable semantics) There is a natural one- 
to-one correspondence between disjunctive stable models of a disjunctive program P and 
consistent static expansions To of its translation T-c(P) into belief theory augmented 
with the Positive Introspection Axiom, (PIA). 
Proof. By Theorem 2.13 there is a one-to-one correspondence between stable autoepis- 
temic expansions and consistent static expansions of T,L( P). The claim now follows 
from the results obtained in [ 271. 0 
Example 4.8. When augmented with with Axiom, 
(PTA), T T+-(P) from Example 4.5, 
V GotolZurope 
GotoAustralia A Goto.Europe > GotoBoth 
-CGotoBoth 3 Save-Money 
TCGotoAustralia 3 Cancel-Reservation 
TCGoto-Europe > CancelReservation. 
has two static expansions, 
T;=Cn,(TU(GA,~CGE,4GB,SM,CR ,... }), 
T; = Cn, (T u {GE, -CGA, -CGB, SM, CR, . . .}) , 
which correspond to the so-called perfect models of this stratified disjunctive logic 
program [ 241. 
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Several other semantics proposed for disjunctive programs can be obtained in a similar 
way (see e.g. [8]) thus demonstrating the expressive power and modularity of AELB. 
4.4. Combining knowledge and belief: Mixing stable and well-founded negation 
As we have seen in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2, both stable and well-founded (partial 
stable) negation in logic programs can be obtained by translating the nonmonotonic 
negation notC into introspective literals TLC and D-C, respectively. However, the 
existence of both types of introspective literals in AELB allows us to combine both types 
of negation in one belief theory consisting of formulae of the form 
B, A . . A B,, A T!X, A . A 7CCk A B++, A . . A ,%C,, > 
Al v v AI. 
Such a belief theory may be viewed as representing a more general disjunctive logic 
program which permits the simultaneous use of both types of negation. In such logic 
programs, the first k negative premises represent stable negation and the remaining 
ones represent the well-founded negation. The ability to use both types of negation 
significantly increases the expressibility of logic programs. For instance, the example 
&baseball A &football > rentmovie 
TLbaseball A TLfootball > dontbuy-tickets. 
discussed in the Introduction is a special case of such a generalized logic program. 
4.5. Adding strong negation to logic programs 
The negation operator not A used in logic programs does not represent the classical 
negation, but rather a nonmonotonic negation by default. Gelfond and Lifschitz pointed 
out [ 121 that in logic programming, as well as in other areas of nonmonotonic reasoning, 
it is often useful to use both the nonmonotonic negation and a different negation, -A, 
which they called “classical negation” but which can perhaps more appropriately be 
called “strong negation” [ I]. They also extended the stable model semantics to the 
class of extended logic programs with strong negation. 
It is easy to add strong negation to the autoepistemic logic of knowledge and beliefs, 
AELB. All one needs to do is to augment the original objective language K with new 
objective propositional symbols “-A” with the intended meaning that “-A is the strong 
negation of A”, or, equivalently, “-A is the opposite of A” and assume the following 
strong negation axiom schema: 
(SNA) A A -A > false, or, equivalently, -A > 7A. 
Observe that, as opposed to classical negation 1, the law of excluded middle A V -A 
is not assumed. As pointed out by Bob Kowalski, the proposition A may describe the 
property of being “good’ while proposition -A describes the property of being “bad”. 
The strong negation axiom states that things cannot be both good and bad. We do not 
assume, however, that things must always be either good or bad. 
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Since this method of defining strong negation applies to all belief theories, it applies, 
in particular, to normal and disjunctive logic programs (see also [ l] ). Moreover, the 
following theorem shows that the resulting general framework provides a strict general- 
ization of the original approach proposed by Gelfond and Lifschitz. 
Theorem 4.9. (Embeddability of extended stable semantics) There is a one-to-one 
correspondence between stable models M of an extended logic program P with strong 
negation, as defined in [ 121, and consistent static autoepistemic expansions T* of its 
translation Tic (P) into belief theory in which strong negation of an atom A is translated 
into -A. 
Proof. Easily follows from Theorem 2.13 and the results obtained in [29]. q 
The reader is referred to [4-61 for a much more thorough discussion of strong 
negation as well as explicit negation in belief theories. The notion of strong negation is 
used in the next section. 
5. Epistemic specifications as knowledge and belief theories 
Epistemic speci$cations were recently introduced in [lo] using a fairly involved 
language of belief sets and world views which includes two operators, KF and MF, 
called belief and possibility operators, respectively. As an illustration of the expressive 
power of the Autoepistemic Logic of Minimal Beliefs, AELB, we now demonstrate that 
epistemic specifications can be also isomorphically embedded as a proper subset of 
AELB, and thus, in particular, epistemic specifications can be defined entirely in the 
language of classical propositional logic. 
We show that Gelfond’s belief operator KF can be defined as Cf3F and thus have 
the intended meaning “F is known to be believed”. On the other hand, the possibility 
operator MF is proved to be equivalent to ~KYF, or, equivalently, to 473-F. The 
translation provides therefore an example of a nested use of the belief and knowledge 
operators, I3 and II: (see also the axiom (CCWA) in Section 4.3). 
Due to the space limitation, we assume familiarity with epistemic specifications. Let 
G be a database describing Gelfond’s epistemic specification. Define T(G) to be its 
translation into autoepistemic logic of minimal beliefs, AELB, obtained by 
(i) Replacing, for all objective atoms A, the classical negation symbol 1A by the 
strong negation symbol 4. We assume that the objective language K was first 
augmented with strong negation atoms -A as described in Section 4.5. 
(ii) Eliminating Gelfond’s “possibility” operator M by replacing every expression of 
the form MF by the expression -K-F, where K is Gelfond’s “belief” operator. 
(iii) Finally, eliminating Gelfond’s “belief” operator K by replacing every expression 
of the form KF by the autoepistemic formula CBF. 
The substitution (i) is motivated by the fact that in his paper Gelfond uses the classical 
negation symbol 1A when in fact he refers to strong negation -A. The substitution 
allows us to reserve the standard negation symbol 7A for true classical negation. The 
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substitution (ii) is motivated by the fact that Gelfond’s “possibility” operator MF 
can now be shown to be equivalent to -KlF, and, vice versa, KF can be shown to 
be equivalent to TM-F. The last substitution (iii) leads to a complete translation of 
epistemic specifications into an autoepistemic theory of knowledge and belief. It replaces 
KF by the formula Ct3F with the intended meaning “F is known to be believed”. 
Equivalently, its intended meaning can be described by “F is known to be true in all 
minimal models”. 
The following result shows that epistemic specifications are isomorphically embed- 
dable into the autoepistemic logic of minimal beliefs, AELB. 
Theorem 5.1. (Embeddability of epistemic specifications) Epistemic specijcations are 
isomorphically embeddable into the autoepistemic logic of minimal beliefs, AELB. More 
precisely, there is a one-to-one correspondence between world views V of an epistemic 
specification G and static autoepistemic expansions T* of its translation T(G) into 
AELB. Moreover, there is a one-to-one correspondence between belief sets B of a world 
view V and minimal models M of the corresponding static expansion T* of T(G) . 
Proof. The limited size of this paper does not allow us to provide all the details involved 
in the definition of epistemic specifications. Consequently, the proof of this theorem will 
appear elsewhere [30]. 0 
Remark 5.2. It is important to point out that formulae in epistemic specifications can 
contain existential quantifiers. However, since existential quantification in epistemic spec- 
ifications is defined by means of substituting all terms of the corresponding Herbrand 
universe for the quantified variables, it is completely equivalent to a (possibly infinite) 
quantifier-free theory. Consequently, the non-existence of quantifiers in AELB does not 
hinder in any way the generality of the above result. 
Gelfond’s paper contains several interesting examples of epistemic specifications 
which now can be easily translated into the language of AELB. 
6. Modifying the notion of belief 
The proposed formalism of Autoepistemic Logic of Knowledge and Belief is quite 
flexible and allows various extensions and modifications. We have already seen that one 
can often ensure desired meaning of autoepistemic theories by adding suitable axioms 
to the logic AELB. Below we show that the meaning of theories in AELB can also be 
adjusted by suitably changing the underlying nonmonotonic formalism on which the 
notion of belief is based. 
In our approach we used the minimal model semantics T ktin F or the Generalized 
Closed World Assumption GCWA [ 191 to define the meaning of our beliefs I3F. In other 
words, F is believed if F is true in all minimal models of the expansion. As illustrated 
by the following example, by using the weak minimal model semantics T kwmin F 
or the Weak Generalized Closed World Assumption WGCWA [ 32,331 instead and thus 
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requiring that F is believed if F is true in all weakly minimal models of T, one can 
ensure that disjunctions are treated inclusively rather than exclusively. Due to the limited 
size of the paper the reader is referred to the above listed publications for the definition 
of weakly minima1 models. 
Example 6.1. Consider the following (translated) positive program T: 
AVB 
AAB > C. 
Let 79 = Cn,(T). Clearly, in all weakly minima1 models of p the disjunction A V B 
holds. On the other hand, while the disjunction 1A V 1B is true in all minimal models 
of 7’e it is not true in all weakly minima1 models of To. Therefore, 
To kwrni,, A V B and p kmin ?A V 1B and yet p kw,i” -A V 1B. 
As a result: 
{B(AvB),~(-Av~B),B~C} cT1=~#) 
but only {B(A V B)} g Th = P,“(p), 
where by the index “w” we indicate the fact that we are using WGCWA instead of 
GCWA in the definition of static expansions and static completion. It is easy to see that 
T’ = WT(T' ) is a fixed point and therefore 
Similarly, TJ = P+” (Td) is a fixed point and therefore 
TW = T u {B(A v B)}. 
We conclude that under GCWA we can derive that both A V B and -IA V -B as well as 
-C are believed, whereas WGCWA only allows us to believe A V B. 
Both GCWA and WGCWA are very natural nonmonotonic formalisms which seem to 
closely correspond to the intuitive meaning of negation in logic programs and deductive 
databases. However, they also share an important feature which in some applications 
domains may be viewed as a drawback, namely the fact that they both minimize only 
positive literals (atoms) thus leading to immediate asymmetry between positive and 
negative literals. If this feature of GCWA and WGCWA is undesirable, one can use 
some other nonmonotonic formalism, naturally leading to a different notion of belief 
and thus to a different semantics. In particular, one can use a suitable form of predicate 
or formula circumscription which minimizes those and only those predicates (formulae) 
whose minimization is desired. 
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7. Conclusion 
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We introduced an extension, AELB, of Moore’s autoepistemic logic, AEL, and showed 
that it provides a powerful and general knowledge representation framework unifying 
several well-known nonmonotonic formalisms and semantics for normal and disjunctive 
logic programs. It allows us to compare different formalisms, better understand mutual 
relationships existing between them and introduce simpler and more natural definitions 
of some of them. 
Other applications of AELB include contradiction removal, abduction and diagnosis 
[ 3,4]. In [9] semantic and syntactic characterizations of static expansions are ob- 
tained in special classes of belief theories which are then used in the implementation 
of a prototype interpreter for disjunctive logic programming. In [ 81 these characteriza- 
tions of static expansions are used to establish a close relationship between the static 
semantics and the disjunctive well-founded semantics, D-WFS [7], of disjunctive pro- 
grams. 
The proposed formalism significantly differs from other formalisms based on the 
notion of minimal beliefs. In particular, it it is different from the circumscriptive au- 
toepistemic logic introduced in [25] and the logic of minimal beliefs and negation as 
failure proposed in [ 161. The proposed approach is also quite flexible by allowing vari- 
ous extensions and modifications, including the use of a different formalism defining the 
meaning of beliefs and introduction of additional axioms. By using such modifications 
one may be able to tailor the formalism to fulfill the needs of different application 
domains. 
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